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ABSTRACT 
 
Requirements engineering is a subfield of software engineering that is concerned with 
analyzing software requirements specifications. An important process of requirement 
engineering is tracing requirements to investigate relationships between requirements and 
other software artifacts (i.e., source code, test cases, etc.). Requirements traceability is mostly 
manual because of difficulties automating the process. A specific mode of tracing is inter-
requirements traceability, which focuses on tracing requirements with other requirements. 
Investigating inter-requirements traceability is very important because it has significant 
influence on many activities of software engineering such as requirements implementation, 
consistency checking, and requirements impact change management. Several studies used 
different approaches to identify three types of relationships: cooperative, conflicting, and 
irrelevant. However, the current solutions have several shortcomings: (1) only applicable to 
fuzzy requirements, user requirements, and technical requirements, (2) ignoring the syntactic 
and semantic aspects of software requirements, and (3) little attention was given to show the 
influence of security requirements on functional requirements. Furthermore, several 
traceability tools have a lack of using predefined rules to identify relationships.  
To overcome these limitations, our approach uses a rule based system to construct 
several deterministic detection rules that identify relationship types between security and 
functional requirements. Our proposed approach has two main parts: (1) Security Functional 
Tracing Model (SFTM), and (2) Security Functional Requirements Diagram (SFRD). To apply 
SFTM and generate SFRD, we developed a tool called Detection Rules Constructor (DRC). 
The experimental results shows that our approach is very effective for automating the tracing 
of security requirements with functional requirements. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This research is related to requirements engineering, requirements traceability, security 
and functional requirements, domain ontology, and rule based system. In this chapter, we 
briefly introduce each of these areas. 
1.1. Requirements Engineering  
Requirements engineering [1] is a first phase of software life cycle that is concerned 
with the use of systematic and repeatable techniques that ensure the completeness, consistency, 
and relevance of the system requirements as in Figure 1. Thus, requirements engineering [2] 
must identify the software functionalities and the constraints on how the software must be 
designed and implemented. Requirements engineering includes five main activities; 
requirements elicitation, requirements analysis, requirements specification, requirements 
verification, and requirements management. The final output of requirements engineering is 
the software requirements specification (SRS), which is a document that clearly describes each 
requirement’s functions, performance, design constraints, and quality attributes of the 
software. 
There is an increasing awareness of the importance of requirements engineering, based 
on empirical investigations and industry experiences, many studies [3, 4, 5] emphasized that 
the requirements engineering process is an essential contributor to the overall quality of 
software. As a significant process of software engineering, requirements engineering [6] plays 
a critical role throughout the whole software engineering lifecycle.  
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A major problem is that poorly defined requirements often lead to the failure of a 
software project. As a result, well-defined requirements will increase the possibility of the 
overall success of a software project.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Software development life cycle 
 
1.2. Requirements Traceability  
Requirements traceability is an important activity of the requirement engineering 
process that concentrate on finding relationships between requirements, or between 
requirements and other software artifacts as in Figure 2. Requirements traceability [7] is 
defined as the process of linking requirements with either design, implementation components 
(i.e., forward direction) or with its source’s (i.e., backward direction). Requirements 
traceability has a significant impact on different activities of software engineering process such 
as requirements change management [8, 9], requirements implementation [10], release 
planning [11,12] and requirements management [13]. 
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Figure 2.  Software requirements traceability 
 
Several studies have tried to propose relationships between software requirements for 
several purposes. For example, Karlsson et al. [14] created a preliminary set of requirements 
dependency types in order to use it in requirements selection such as prioritizing task of 
software requirements. Furthermore, Pohl [15] and Dahlst-edt and Persson [16] used literature 
reviews particularly in the requirements engineering field to propose several dependency types 
among software requirements. Carlshamre et al. [17] studied the effect of requirements 
dependencies in release planning process by organizing a particular industry survey on 
requirements. In addition, Goknil, Kurtev, and van den Berg [18] investigated the applicability 
of using dependency types between requirements for analyzing the process of impact change.  
Requirements traceability [19] has two main modes, inter-requirements traceability and 
extra-requirements traceability. Inter-requirements traceability focuses on tracing requirements 
with other requirements while extra-requirements traceability focuses on tracing requirements 
with other software artifacts (i.e., source code, test cases, and etc.). Inter-requirements 
traceability influences a number of activities during the software development process: 
requirements implementation, consistency checking, and change impact. The scope of our 
research considers the inter-requirements traceability rather than the extra-requirements 
traceability because we intend to investigate the relationship types between security and 
functional requirements. 
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1.3. Security and Functional Requirements 
Security requirements are a specific class of non-functional requirements that focuses 
on system confidentiality, reliability, integrity, and availability that required to be fulfilled in 
order to attain the intended security features for the system. Meaning that, it is not investigated 
until all of the functional requirements have been fully identified. Security requirements 
describe how the system should follow a reliable procedure to protect itself from information 
disclosure, information threat, and information corruption. It guarantees that the system 
applies a certain manner to keep a secure access, secure communication, and secure storage. 
While functional requirements describe the system behavior by expressing it as inputs to the 
system, outputs from the system, and relationships between inputs and outputs. There are 
several parties involved in the requirements engineering process, each has different 
backgrounds, knowledge, concerns, perceptions, and expressions. These parties include 
customers, users, domain experts, requirements engineers, software developers, and etc., they 
might have a conflicting viewpoints [20] among them in some cases. As a result, there is an 
essential necessity to discover relationships between security and functional requirements to 
detect such conflict, show which security requirements affect which functional requirements, 
and determine the type for this effect. 
1.4. Domain Ontology  
Domain ontology is a very popular semantic processing technique that classifies 
concepts and relations between concepts within a particular domain. Due to the difficulty of 
automated analysis of software requirements, and the bottlenecks in dealing with Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) techniques, semantic techniques are required to analyze software 
requirements in higher quality rather than traditional natural language techniques.  
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Using domain ontology in requirements engineering helps to better understanding and 
capturing the requirements information. Additionally, reusing and sharing of concepts and 
relations that are represented by the ontology. An example of a domain ontology is an 
ontology for the health domain. In order to apply domain ontology for analyzing software 
requirements, several studies used domain ontology for many goals. For example, Kaiya and 
Saeki [21] used domain ontology to measure the overall quality of requirements document. 
Also, Li et al. [22] used domain ontology to simplify the requirements elicitation process.  
Assawamekin, Sunetnanta, and Pluempitiwiriyawejet [23] used a domain ontology to 
solve semantic dissimilarities between multi-views requirements. In addition, Jyothilakshmi 
and Samuel [24] used domain ontology to extract the class diagram from the functional 
requirements. In another study, Lee et al. [25] used domain ontology models to extract the 
main attributes and constraints of regulatory requirements.  
Moreover, L´opez, Cysneiros, and Astudillo [26] used ontology to describe non-
functional requirements and design foundation by using a goal dependency graph in order to 
reuse the knowledge about non-functional requirements. Also, Falbo, Guizzardi, and Duarte 
[27] presented ontology approach for domain engineering that linked ontologies and objects in 
object oriented methodology.  
Jureta, Mylopoulos, and Faulkner [28] proposed an essential ontology for software 
requirements engineering that covered the main concerns and intentions of the stakeholders to 
make a nearly complete view about requirements engineering problem. Our approach uses 
domain ontology for automating the traceability between security and functional requirements. 
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1.5. Rule Based System  
IF-THEN [29] rules are one of the most common forms of the knowledge 
representation. Systems that employed such rules as the major representation are called rule 
based systems. The statements after IF are called the conditions (i.e., antecedents), those after 
THEN are called the conclusions (i.e., consequents). We decide to use a rule based system to 
construct new detection rules because it has the following advantages: Very useful approach to 
represent knowledge, simple to construct, and easy to understand without extra interpretation. 
1.6. Problem Statement 
Manual traceability requires an extreme amount of effort and time. As a result, 
automating of requirements traceability among various types of software requirements is very 
necessary to make the task of requirements traceability more achievable and cost effective. 
Several requirements tractability tools proposed in the literature, but many lack to use a 
predefined deterministic rules to identify relationships between requirements. Moreover, 
several approaches [30, 31, 32, 33] that were proposed to identify cooperative, conflicting, and 
irrelevant relationships however these current approaches have several limitations such as: 
limited to fuzzy requirements, a little consideration to show the effects of security 
requirements upon functional requirements, and lack of capturing the syntactic and semantic 
aspects of requirements. To overcome such problems, we developed a requirements diagram, 
Security Functional Requirements Diagram (SFRD) that shows the relationships types 
between security and functional requirements. Our approach is designed to overcome the 
current limitations by capturing syntactic and semantic aspects of requirements, shows the 
effects of security requirements onto functional requirements, and it is applicable for both 
certain and uncertain (i.e., fuzzy) requirements.  
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Our solution is a hybrid approach, it uses syntactic parsing technique to extract 
requirements statements constructs, domain ontology to create a knowledge repository about 
security and functional requirements domain, and a rule based system to build multiple 
detection rules that identify the effect types of security requirements upon functional 
requirements. In addition, we develop a tool called Detection Rules Constructor (DRC) that 
efficiently applies the domain ontology based tractability approach and graphically generate 
SFRD. 
Our traceability tool captures the syntactic and semantic aspects of the natural 
requirements text and applies 343 different detection rules to identify three types of effect: (1) 
cooperative, (2) conflicting, and (3) irrelevant.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research is related to security and functional requirements, inter-requirements 
relationships, and traceability tools. This chapter presents a background material for these 
areas. 
2.1. Security and Functional Requirements  
There are many studies that defined precisely security and functional requirements. For 
example, Haley et al. [34] described the security requirements as a part of non-functional 
requirements that constrained the functional requirements of a system. Kotonya and 
Sommerville [35] defined security requirements as restrictions or constraints on system 
services. Also, Rushby [36] defined security requirements as mostly concerns of the system 
that must not occur.  
While functional requirements [37] are defined as the requirements that describe the 
system behavior by expressing it as the inputs to the system, the outputs from the system, and 
the relationships between inputs and outputs. Another study [38] defined it as what the system 
should do in terms of its functionalities and services that it should provide. Security 
requirements have several types [39] such as the following: 
1. Identification Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the level to which an 
application shall identify the externals users. 
• Example: The system shall identify all of its users before allowing them to use its 
resources. 
2. Authentication Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the level to which the 
system shall verify the identity of its externals users. 
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• Example: The system shall verify the identity of all of its users. 
3. Authorization Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the access privileges of 
authenticated users. 
• Example: The system shall allow each user to gain access to all his/her account 
information. 
4. Immunity Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the level to which the system 
shall protect itself from infection such as viruses, hackers, and worms. 
• Example: The system shall protect itself from viruses. 
5. Integrity Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the level to which keeps the 
information safe from illegal corruption or modification. 
• Example: The system shall prevent the unauthorized corruption of all user 
information. 
6. Privacy Requirements: a security requirement that identifies the level to which the system 
shall keep all critical data private from illegal users. 
• Example: The system shall not allow unauthorized users access to any stored data. 
Since security requirements [34, 35] are considered as constraints on functional 
requirements of the system. The investigation of relationships between security and functional 
requirements helps for checking consistency, prioritizing security requirements, finding 
association between security requirements, and analyzing the impact of relationships change.  
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2.2. Cooperative, Conflicting, and Irrelevant Relationships  
Identifying cooperative, conflicting, and irrelevant relationships between software 
requirements is very important because it affects several significant factors such as 
requirements implementation, consistency checking, and impact change. In the literature, 
several studies had used different approaches to identify cooperative, conflicting, and 
irrelevant relationships. 
Egyed and Grünbacher [30] proposed an approach for determining conflicts and 
cooperation dependencies among software requirements using the quality attributes of 
requirements and automated trace analyzer technique. Their approach consists of the following 
steps. First, manually classifying of software requirements into related quality attributes using 
international taxonomy of requirements. Second, automatic detection of cooperation and 
conflicts based on their associated quality characteristics using a specific model of potential 
impacts among software requirements, as well as ISO 9126 standardization. Third, automatic 
generation of dependencies among requirements by using a trace analyzer tool for the 
associated source code. A trace analyzer uses testing to generate trace dependencies. Fourth, 
filtering all the related attributes for both cooperation and conflicts among software 
requirements by measuring the requirements overlapping. For example, if two requirements 
execute the same lines of code, then they are overlapping, this reflects that there exists a trace 
dependency between them, and they can be used for detecting conflict and cooperation. The 
no-overlapping case means that there is no trace dependencies between them and they cannot 
be used for detecting conflict and cooperation effects since they are irrelevant.  
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This approach has several limitations, it is only applicable to product requirements and 
cannot be applied to the other process requirements like schedule and budget requirements, the 
need for source code with the associating requirements. In addition, does not capture the 
syntactic and semantic sides of software requirements. 
Liu [31] identified the conflicts and cooperation dependencies among uncertain 
software requirements by using fuzzy logic technique. He represented each requirement (R) as 
a satisfaction function (i.e., fuzzy subset of the requirement domain D). For example, if a 
satisfaction of the first requirement increases the satisfaction of the second requirement, then 
they are cooperative while if satisfaction of the first requirement decreases the satisfaction of 
the second requirement, then they are conflicting. Also, they are irrelevant if the satisfaction of 
the first requirement does not have any effect on the satisfaction of the second requirement. 
The disadvantages for this approach are: it is only applicable to the fuzzy requirements that 
have uncertain terms like low, high, and medium. Also, it ignores the semantic and syntactic 
aspects of software requirements. 
In another study, Temponi, Yen, and Tiao [32] employed Quality Functional 
Deployment (QFD) methodology to translate customer satisfaction (i.e., customer 
requirements) into organization functions (i.e., technical requirements) and they used fuzzy 
logic based requirements analysis to represent QFD because it can handle the imprecise 
expressions in the requirements. Based on this representation, they identified cooperative and 
conflicting relationships between customer and technical requirements. In addition, based on 
the existing customer and technical requirements relationships. This approach considers only 
the imprecise customer and technical requirements, it does not show impact of non-functional 
requirements onto functional requirements. 
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Lee and Xue [33] used a goal based approach to analyze and evaluate the cooperative, 
conflicting, and irrelevant relationships between user requirements. They represented the user 
requirements by building the use case models with the associated goals. In order to find the 
user requirements relationships, they found the relationships between use cases and the 
associated goals by identifying the certain satisfied and denied use cases for each goal, then 
finding interactions between goals in both use case and system level. For example, at the use 
case level, if a use case satisfied with the first goal and denied with the second goal, then both 
goals have a conflicting relationship while if a use case satisfied with the first and second 
goals, then both goals have a cooperative relationship. At the system level, both goals are 
conflicting if the cooperative predicate is false and conflicting predicate is true, and they are 
cooperative if cooperative predicate is true and conflicting predicate is false while they are 
irrelevant if both of cooperative and conflicting predicate is false. This approach considers 
only the relationships between functional requirements (i.e., user requirements) and does not 
find the relationships between functional and non-functional requirements. This approach 
applies in particular to the user requirements. Our approach differs from the current 
approaches. Our approach covers both non-functional and functional requirements rather than 
just focusing on one type of requirements like fuzzy requirements. Also, it captures both 
syntactic and semantic aspects of software requirements as in Table 1. It is a hybrid approach 
that applies: (1) syntactic parsing technique for requirements statements to decompose each 
requirement statement into three constructs (i.e., Subject-concept, Verb-concept, and 
Complement-concept), (2) domain ontology to capture the semantic meaning for security and 
functional requirements concepts and relations, and (3) rule based system to construct 
detection rules that identify cooperative, conflicting, and irrelevant relationships. 
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Table 1. Features matrix for the requirements traceability approaches   
 
2.3. Requirements Traceability Tools 
Automated solutions to requirements traceability face a difficult challenge due to the 
need to handle multiple types of software requirements and relationships that generated during 
the requirements analysis. Additionally, these software requirements are typically written 
using natural language making them very challenging to process automatically. Furthermore, 
the task of searching the requirements documents manually looking for the relationships is 
time and effort consuming. This situation increases the necessity to automate the requirements 
traceability among various types of software requirements to make the task of requirements 
traceability more achievable and cost effective. Automating the requirements traceability has 
several benefits such: reduce the effort of manual finding of relationships, and reduce the 
human errors that appears when trying to produce this information manually. Several 
requirements traceability tools have been identified to relate requirements with other 
requirements, or requirements with other software artifacts.  
 
 
           Features  
 
                         Requirements traceability approach 
Egyed and 
Grünbacher 
[30] 
Liu 
[31] 
Temponi, 
Yen, and Tiao 
[32] 
Lee and 
Xue [33] 
Our 
approach 
Capturing syntactic and 
semantic aspects of 
requirements 
✘ ✘ 
 
✘ ✘ ✔ 
Finding relationships 
between non-functional and 
functional requirements 
✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ ✔ 
Applying for fuzzy 
requirements 
✘ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ 
Applying for precise 
requirements 
✔ ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔ 
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However, less attention has been paid for relating functional requirements with other 
non-functional requirements, and there is a lack of using a predefined deterministic rules to 
identify relationships between requirements.  
For instance, Rational RequisitePro [40] provides only two general relations types 
between requirements: traceFrom and traceTo but there is no specific definitions for these 
relations. It used to manage requirements and allows the user to associate attributes and 
rational with requirement documents. However, the user manually adds relationships if other 
software artifacts are involved. Also, SysML [41] has three relations: contain, copy, and 
derive. However, there are no precise rules on how to determine these relations.   
In addition, Telelogic Doors [42], linking requirements to design items, test plans, test 
cases and other requirements but there is no deterministic types for the requirements relations 
such the user can specify his own relation type, they define specific relationship types but they 
do not attach any meaning to these types. TopTeam Analyst [43], there are four relation types: 
trace, tracing links into, impact, and used in. None of these relation types have formal semantic 
definition. Also, QUARCC [44] supports finding dependencies between non-functional 
requirements, and does not consider dependencies between functional and non-functional 
requirements. These tools have lack to support consistency checking of the relations.  
Our tool addresses the previous tools limitations such as: (1) defines several user-
predefined detection rules for each type of relations (i.e., cooperative, conflicting, and 
irrelevant), (2) relates functional and non-functional requirements, (3) captures syntactic and 
semantic aspects of requirements, and (4) checks the consistency of the relations. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
3.1. Domain Ontology Based Detection Approach 
To decrease the ambiguity and inconsistency of the informal natural language of 
requirements, our approach captures both the syntactic and semantic features of requirements 
statements as in Figure 3. The syntactic aspect of requirements focuses on the grammatical 
analysis of requirements statements parts like Subject, Verb, and Complement, and the 
semantic aspect of requirements focuses on understanding the meaning of requirements. In our 
research, we integrate syntactic analysis (i.e., syntactic parsing) and semantic analysis (i.e., 
domain ontology), which helps to identify relationships between security and functional 
requirements.  
 
 
  Figure 3. An overview of our approach 
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Domain ontology is a very common semantic processing technique that is used to 
analyze the requirements specifications. Thus, we used it to determine the relations between 
the security and functional requirements concepts. Also, we decided to use a rule based system 
to construct our new detection rules to determine the types of relationships.  Our approach 
includes the following steps: 
1. Applying syntactic parsing on the security and functional requirements statements by using 
an online parsing tool [45] to split each security and functional requirements statements 
into Subject, Verb, and Complement constructs. We consider each requirement construct 
as a single concept, each requirement statement has three concepts: Subject, Verb, and 
Complement. Each concept can be either a single term or a phrase.  
2. Building the domain ontology to represent the domain concepts and relations for a 
particular domain. Security and functional requirement Concepts have three types: (1) 
Subject-concept (which represents requirement entity), (2) Verb-concept (which represents 
requirement action) and (3) Complement concept (which represents the extra description 
for the requirement entity or the Object that represents requirement target). The relations 
have five main types: Generalization, Aggregation, Association, Synonyms, and 
Antonyms. The domain ontology contains two sets: (1) Concepts = {Subject-concept, 
Verb-concept, and Complement-concept} and (2) Relations between concepts = 
{Generalization, Aggregation, Association, Synonyms, and Antonyms}. Figure 4 shows 
our domain ontology, in which the first three relations (i.e., Generalization, Aggregation, 
and Association) are extracted from the built class diagram. Also, the last two relations 
(i.e., Synonyms and Antonyms) are extracted from WordNet [46], it is a lexical database of 
English, and then mapped into the domain ontology as in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Domain ontology for our approach 
 
3. Generating detection rules, each detection rule includes three conditions (i.e., three 
relations between security and functional requirement concepts) and single conclusion (i.e., 
single effect type), effect can be one of following types: Cooperates with, Conflicts with, 
and Irrelevant to. Every ontology has a reasoning engine and the rule based system has 
been considered as a reasoning engine for our domain ontology.  
4. Identifying the Effect-type of the security requirement onto the functional requirement 
based on the detection rules.  
Our approach consists of two important parts: (1) Security Functional Tracing Model 
(SFTM), and (2) Security Functional Requirements Diagram (SFRD). SFTM is the tracing 
model for both security and functional requirements while SFTM is a requirements diagram 
that illustrates the effects of security requirements upon functional requirements. 
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3.2. Security Functional Tracing Model (SFTM) 
Inter-requirements traceability refers to finding the relationships between requirements. 
Identifying cooperative, conflicting, and irrelevant relationships between security and 
functional requirements is very important requirements engineering activity because it affects 
several significant software activities such as requirements implementation, consistency 
checking, and impact of requirements change. 
In this research, we propose a tracing model called SFTM that applies a whole tracing 
to cover the relationships between the whole set of security and functional requirements. Our 
automated tracing model is a quicker method and relatively inexpensive rather than manual 
tracing approach. 
This model consists of four essential sub sets: Security requirements, Functional 
requirements, Tracing pairs, and Effect types. Each set is a subset of the superset SFTM. For 
example, if we have system x, we represent the main components of our tracing model as 
follows: 
1. Security Requirements set, denoted as: SR(x) = {SRi, SRi+1,…,SRn}, where x is the name of 
software system. 
2. Functional Requirements set, denoted as: FR(x) = {FRj, FRj+1,…,FRm}. 
3. Tracing Pairs set,  denoted as T(x) ={ (SRi, FRj),(SRi, FRj+1),…,(SRi, FRm), (SRi+1, FRj),( 
SRi+1, FRj+1),…,( SRi+1, FRm),…, (SRn, FRj),( SRn, FRj+1),…,( SRn, FRm)}. 
4. Effect types set, denoted as E(x) = {Cooperates with, Conflicts with, and Irrelevant to}, here 
we read the effect type starting from functional requirement side then effect type then 
security requirement, for instance: FRi “Cooperates with” with SRi.  
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SFTM is a super-set that contains the four previous subsets and is represented as:  
SFTM (x) = {SR(x), FR(x), T(x), E(x)}. The idea behind this approach is to trace the first 
security requirement (SRi) with the whole set of functional requirements {FRj, 
FRj+1,…,FRm}. Then, for each single tracing pair (SRi, FRj) there will be a single particular 
effect type by using the detection rules. The same tracing technique will be applied 
respectively for the second security requirement (SRi+1) and similarly continue until the last 
security requirement (SRn).For example, if there is system A that has three security 
requirements {SR1, SR2, SR3} and 6 functional requirements {FR1,…, FR6}. The tracing 
approach is to map the first security requirement (SR1) with all 6 functional requirements 
{FR1,…, FR6}. Next, the second security requirement (SR2), until the third security 
requirement (SR3) proceeds through the tracing of 6 functional requirements. For each pair, 
the relationship type (i.e., effect type) will be identified based on the predefined detection 
rules.  
As a result, in total there are 18 tracing pairs with 18 effect types (i.e., 6 tracing links 
for each security requirement and 6 effect types for each security requirement). Figure 3 shows 
the tracing process and the associated effect types for SR1 with all 6 functional requirements 
{FR1,…, FR6}. In Figure 5, there are 6 tracing links between SR1 and the whole set of 
functional requirements {FR1,…, FR6} as well as 6 effect types. 
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 Figure 5. Security functional tracing of SR1 for system A 
 
Figure 6 shows the tracing process and the associated effect types for SR2 with all 6 
functional requirements {FR1,…, FR6}. There are 6 tracing links and 6 effect types such as: 
Conflicts with, Cooperates with, Irrelevant to, Cooperates with, Cooperates with, Cooperates 
with.  
 
Figure 6. Security functional tracing of SR2 for system A 
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Figure 7 shows the tracing process and the associated effect types for SR3 with all 6 
functional requirements {FR1,…, FR6}. There are 6 tracing links and 6 effect types such as: 
Irrelevant to, Irrelevant to, Conflicts with, Conflicts with, Cooperates with, Irrelevant to.  
 
 
Figure 7. Security functional tracing of SR3 for system A 
 
Based on our traced model, system A will be represented as the following 
mathematical notations: 
1. SR(system A) ={ SR1, SR2, SR3} 
2. FR(system A) = { FR1,… ,FR6} 
3. T (system A) = {(SR1, FR1),…, (SR1, FR6),…, (SR3, FR1),..., (SR3, FR6)}. 
4. E(system A) = { Conflicts with,…,Cooperates with,…, Irrelevant to,…, Irrelevant to } 
5. SFTM (system A) = {{ SR1, SR2},{ FR1,…,FR6},{(SR1, FR1),… ,(SR1, FR6),…,(SR3, 
FR1),…,(SR2, FR6)}, {Conflicts with,…,Cooperates with,…, Irrelevant to,…, Irrelevant 
to}} 
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3.3. Security Functional Requirement Diagram (SFRD) 
Since security requirements are considered as constraints on functional requirements, 
we called relationships types as effects types. We propose requirements diagram called 
Security Functional Requirement Diagram (SFRD) that shows the effect types of security 
requirements upon Functional requirements. The diagram has been graphed as a tabular form, 
in which the columns represent the security requirements while the rows represent the 
functional requirements. Each cell (i.e. intersection between each column and each row) 
indicates whether the functional requirement is affected/or not by the security requirement. 
Different types of effects (i.e., relationships) have been indicated by different colors. For 
example, a functional requirement that cooperates with security requirement is shown in green, 
a functional requirement that conflicts with security requirement is shown in red, and a 
functional requirement that is irrelevant to security requirement is shown in yellow. 
Consequently, SFRD for System A will be tabulated as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. SFRD for system A 
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3.4. Domain Ontology for Security and Functional Requirements   
In respect to the traceability goal, our traceability approach uses domain ontology to 
represent domain knowledge for security and functional requirements. The domain ontology 
has the concepts and the relations, the concepts have three types:  
1. Subject-concept (i.e., requirement entity) 
2. Verb-concept (i.e., requirement action)  
3. Complement-concept (i.e., extra description for the requirement entity, or the object that 
represents requirement target). For example, in this security requirement statement “The 
system shall not contain any failure”. “The system” represents the Subject-concept, “shall 
not contain” represents the Verb-concept, and “any failure” represents the Complement-
concept. 
 For the relations between concepts, we used the class diagram to find Generalization, 
Aggregation, and Association relations [47]. In addition, we consider if two concepts have a 
pre-condition and post-condition relation, then they have an association. For example, register 
is a pre-condition for log in functionality. Furthermore, authenticate is a post-condition for log 
in functionality. 
Additionally, we use the WordNet to find Synonyms and Antonyms relations [48]. 
Also, we add two more relations between concepts that reflect “Exact matching” and “No- 
matching” cases. Each of these relations is defined as follows: 
1. Generalization: Generalization (also called inheritance) occurs when one concept (child) 
inherits some properties from another concept (parent). For example, an audio player is a 
music player. 
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2. Aggregation: Aggregation occurs when one concept is part of another concept (whole). For 
example, an engine is a part a car. 
3. Association: Association represents a binary interaction between two concepts. For example, 
the instructor grades the course. 
4. Synonyms: A Synonym is defined as two different concepts that have similar meanings. For 
example, Close and Shut are Synonyms. 
5. Antonyms: An Antonym is when two concepts that have opposite meanings. For example, 
Add and Remove are Antonyms. 
6. Identical: An Identical relation occurs when both concepts have the same name (i.e., exact 
matching). For example, Identical (personal information, personal information). 
7. No-relation: No-relation occurs when both concepts do not have any of the previous 
specified relations. For example, No-relation (user password, customer address). 
We build the domain ontology, as a class diagram [49], which includes a single class 
for each concept. Subject-concept, Verb-concept, and Complement-concept are stereotyped as 
<<Subject>>, <<Verb>>, and <<Compl>> respectively.  A concept can be a single term or a 
whole phrase. In our approach, during the parsing step we handle positive and negative 
modifiers that usually used with the verbs in the natural language of the requirements 
description, the positive modifiers indicated for the synonyms while the negative modifiers 
indicated for the antonyms. Table 2 shows some of the common modifiers that we capture in 
our traceability approach. 
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Table 2. Negative and positive modifiers for inferring the implicit relations 
Modifier Type Relation meaning Example 
Except Negative Antonyms read, except read 
Must Positive Synonyms protect, must protect 
Never Negative  Antonyms never modify, modify 
Shall Positive Synonyms encrypt, shall encrypt 
Only Negative Antonyms only read, write  
Shall Not Negative Antonyms access, shall not access 
Prevent Negative  Antonyms display, prevent display 
   
In addition, during the concepts extraction, we adjust only the user requirement 
statement (i.e., if requirement statement has both system and user as a Subject-concept) while 
the system requirement statement remain without any change (i.e., if requirement statement 
has only system as a Subject-concept) such as in Table 3.  
Table 3. Adjustments of concepts extraction for user requirements statements 
Requirement statement  Subject-
concept 
Verb-
concept 
Complement-
concept 
The system shall not allow the user to change 
the personal information. 
user shall not 
change  
personal 
information 
The system shall allow the user to print the 
invoice. 
user print invoice 
The system shall enable the user to select the 
shipping method. 
user select shipping 
method 
The system shall let the user to change the 
payment option. 
user change payment option 
The system shall list all the available 
promotions. 
system list available 
promotions 
 
 
25 
 
3.5. The Definitions for Effect Types  
Discovering effect types (i.e., relationship types) between security and functional 
requirements has several advantages: improving the understandability of security and 
functional requirements implementation, prioritizing security requirements, finding association 
between security requirements, and detecting inconsistency for security requirements: 
1. Cooperative effect: the functional requirement is positively affected by the security 
requirement, so both security and functional requirements can be implemented at the same 
time. 
• Example: The system shall encrypt the user profile information (SR) 
                The system shall allow user to enter his password (FR) 
2. Conflicting effect: the functional requirement is negatively affected by the security 
requirement, so both security and functional requirements cannot be implemented at the 
same time.  
• Example: The user shall not access the student’s academic records (SR) 
                      The user can modify the student’s grades (FR) 
3. Irrelevant effect: the functional requirement is neither positively nor negatively affected by 
the security requirement, so the implementation of the security requirement does not affect 
the implementation of the functional requirement.  
• Example: The system shall allow user to only read the payment history (SR) 
                The user shall select the product category (FR) 
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3.6. The Detection Rules 
Based on the resulting domain concepts and relations that we obtained from domain 
ontology, we constructed the detection rules to identify the effect types between security and 
functional requirements. These detection rules are constructed using IF-THEN rules. Every 
detection rule has three relations and one effect type as in Figure 9.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The structure of the detection rule 
 
The first relation relates two Subject-concepts, the second relation relates two Verb-
concepts, and the third relation relates two Complement-concepts. Each detection rule has only 
one effect type. In addition, each effect type has several detection rules that have been 
constructed to identify it.  
3.7. Detection Rules Constructor Tool Support       
Requirements traceability [50] is mostly acknowledged to be a highly manual and 
difficult to process. Moreover, automated solutions to requirements traceability considered to 
be a very challenge problem due to the following reasons: 1) the need to handle several types 
of requirements and relations that generated during the requirements analysis, 2) ambiguous 
requirements frequently raise the cost of software projects, and 3) requirements have been 
written using natural language that makes them very hard to process automatically.  
 
 
IF Relation (Subject-concept (SR), Subject-concept (FR)) 
AND Relation (Verb-concept (SR), Verb-concept (FR)) 
AND Relation (Complement-concept (SR), Complement-concept (FR)) 
THEN Effect-type ∈ {Cooperative, Conflicting, Irrelevant} 
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Most requirements traceability tools have paid less consideration for relating functional 
requirements with other non-functional requirements, and there is a lack of using a predefined 
deterministic rules to identify relationships between these requirements. As a result we 
developed a requirements traceability tool called DRC using C#.Net, it mainly uses to let the 
user identify the effect types of security requirements upon functional requirements, and it 
manipulates the three main parts of our traceability approach: domain ontology, effect types, 
and detection rules.  
Our tool efficiently automates the SFRM and finally generates the SFRD. By using the 
DRC, the user can generate three outputs files: 1) matching parsing requirements with domain 
ontology, 2) matching tracing security and functional requirements with the associated 
detection rules numbers, and 3) generating SFRD that graphically showing security 
requirements effects on functional requirements with labeling the associated detection rules 
numbers for each effect. Figure 10 shows the domain ontology of our tool, it combines the 
three types of domain concepts and seven types of the domain relations. 
  
 
Figure 10. The domain ontology interface 
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The domain ontology interface let user to create a knowledge repository of concepts 
and relations for security and functional requirements domain, the tool will automatically 
generate a tree view for the all selected concepts and relations as in Figure 11.  
A tree view is a graphical control element that presents a hierarchical view of domain 
ontology information. Each main node represents requirement concept, and sub nodes 
represent relations between concepts. 
 
 
Figure 11. Tree view for security and functional requirements concepts and relations 
 
In our traceability approach, we have three main concepts and seven relations for each 
of these concepts, as a result we will have 343 possible combinations for the detection rules.  
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After the detection rules have been constructed, the user can save all of the detection 
rules and the associated effect types into an XML file. The detection rules that used in our 
approach are expressed in XML as well as the relation discovery is based on a rule-based 
system. The detection of the effects starts by converting all relationships between security and 
functional requirements into XML file as in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. A portion of the detection rules XML file 
 
Our approach identifies 131 detection rules for cooperative effect, 92 detection rules 
for conflicting effect, and 120 different detection rules for irrelevant effect. Overall, DRC 
handles 343 distinct detection rules that cover the all possible combinations. 
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3.7.1. Inputs for DRC Tool 
Since our approach combines the syntactic and semantic aspects of the requirements, 
then our tool takes two inputs files: 1) Microsoft Word file which represents parsing security 
and functional requirements, and 2) Microsoft Access file which represents the stored domain 
ontology as in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Inputs files for DRC 
 
The MS Word file has the requirements statements with the associated Subject-
concept, Verb-concept, and Complement-concept. Each requirement has been labeled to 
indicate the type and the number for each requirement, and the MS Access file has the 
information repository for security and functional requirements. 
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3.7.2. Outputs for DRC Tool 
Our tool handles 343 different possible combinations for the detection rules, Figure 14 
shows the main interface of our tool that allows the user to automatically generate three 
outputs files based on reading the two inputs files. In this section we will show a brief 
description about each output. 
 
 
Figure 14. Main interface for DRC 
 
A. Comparing parsing security and functional requirements with the domain ontology: This is 
the first output file from our tool such when the user click onto compare task on the main 
interface. The input dialog will prompt the user to select the parsing requirements Word file. 
Then, DRC will automatically apply the comparison with the built domain ontology, and 
generate the whole tracing pairs of security and functional requirements with the 
corresponding Subject-Relation, Verb-Relation, and Complement-Relation. 
B. Matching security and functional requirements with the associated detection rules-ID: This 
is the second output file from the tool, it matches the whole tracing security and functional 
requirements with the associated general detection rules numbers. It is the same as the first 
output file plus adding a new column for the associated detection rules numbers. 
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C. Generating Security and Functional Requirements Diagram: This is the third output file 
from the tool. Based on the first and second output files, our tool generates SFRD which 
significantly provides a well-defined structured manner for illustrating requirements 
traceability. Each cell in SFRD is labeled with the associated detection rule number that 
identifies a certain type of effect. SFRD increases the user understandability for inferring 
potential relationships between security and functional requirements.  
3.8. Importance of Investigating Effect Types of Security Requirements upon Functional 
Requirements 
3.8.1. Prioritization of Security Requirements  
Prioritizing requirements based on importance and dependency lead to have many 
benefits [51, 52]. Firstly, it can be used to show the features in each software product version 
or release planning [53]. Secondly, prioritization supports an accurate method for choosing the 
most important security requirements to implement, which may result in a reduction a number 
of implemented functional requirements [54].  
As a result, one of the significant benefits of our approach is to prioritize security 
requirements based on counting number of functional requirements that cooperate with 
security requirement (i.e. Weight). Each security requirement has a different number of 
associated dependent functional requirements. System A has three security requirements (SR1, 
SR2, and SR3) as in Figure 15. SR1 has three cooperated functional requirements (FR2, FR5, 
and FR6). Also, SR2 has four cooperated functional requirements (FR2, FR4, FR5, and FR6) 
and SR3 has only one cooperated functional requirement (FR5) as follows: 
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• Weight (SR1) = # of cooperated functional requirements nodes with SR1= 3 
• Weight (SR2) = # of cooperated functional requirements nodes with SR2=4 
• Weight (SR3) = # of cooperated functional requirements nodes with SR3= 1 
Therefore, SR2 has the highest priority, and SR3 has the lowest priority. The highest 
priority security requirement positively affects many functional requirements more than any 
other security requirements. This prioritization helps requirements engineer in the 
requirements selection process. 
 
 
Figure 15. The cooperated functional requirements nodes for system A 
 
3.8.2. Finding Association among Security Requirements  
In our approach, we create an association graph for security requirements by using 
Jaccard similarity technique [55]. We measure the association between the security 
requirements nodes based on the mutual cooperated functional requirements nodes. The 
technique is defined as the quotient between the intersection and the union between the 
security requirements as in Equation 1. 
                                               
|SRjSRi|
|SRjSRi| = SRj) n(SRi,Associatio

                                        (Eq. 1) 
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• Where (SRi, SRj) represents security requirements. 
• SRjSRi : represents the number of common cooperated functional requirements 
nodes between SR i and SR j. 
• SRjSRi : represents the number of all cooperated functional requirements nodes in 
both SR i and SR j.  
We use an Association to measure the similarity values between the dependent security 
requirements. For instance, if Association value is equal to zero, both security requirements are 
dissimilar while if Association is equal to one both security requirements are identical. By 
applying Jaccard similarity for the example in Figure 16, the resulting association values have 
been calculated as follows: 
1. Association (SR1, SR2) = 3/4= 0.75 
2. Association (SR1, SR3) = 1/3= 0.33  
3. Association (SR2, SR3) = 1/4= 0.25 
The association between SR1 and SR2 is 0.75, which reflects strongly dependent 
requirements (i.e., highly connected requirements) while the association between SR2 and SR3 
is 0.25, which reflects weakly dependent requirements (i.e., lowly connected requirements). 
 
 
Figure 16. A weighted association graph for system A 
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3.8.3. Finding Inconsistency between Security and Functional Requirements 
The additional valuable benefit that we can get from using SFRD is to find the 
inconsistency [56] for each single security requirement. The inconsistency ratio is calculated 
by considering all the conflicting effects relative to the total number of effects as in Equation 
2. 
 
SRifor  eseffect typ all ofnumber  Total
 SRifor effect  confliting ofNumber  = (SRi) Rationcy Inconsiste                    (Eq. 2) 
• Where, total number of all effects = number of cooperative effect + number of 
conflicting effect + number of irrelevant effect. For system A, we can find the 
following information: 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR1= 1 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR2= 1 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR3= 2 
• Total number of all effects=6, then the inconsistency ratios for the security 
requirements as follows: 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR1) = 1/6 = 0.16 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR2) = 1/6 = 0.16 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR3) = 2/6 = 0.33 
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SR3 has the highest inconsistency ratio among all the security requirements for system 
A, while both SR1 and SR2 have the same ratio. As a result, we can find that if a security 
requirement has more conflicting effects, this leads to increase the inconsistency for the 
requirements. Our goal is to detect the inconsistency between security and functional 
requirements in order to increase the clarity as well as reduce the confusion that will appear in 
the requirement analysis of the software development life cycle. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
A Software requirements specification [57] is a description of the developed behavior 
system includes functional requirements and non-functional requirements. Functional 
requirements describe all the interactions the users will have with the software and non-
functional requirements are requirements which impose constraints on the design or 
implementation, such as performance requirements, quality standards, or design constraints. 
Functional requirements capture the intended behavior of the system. This behavior 
had been expressed as services, or functions the system is required to perform. Security 
requirements are non-functional requirements that define constraints and restrictions on the 
functional requirements that include authorization, access control, authentication, privacy, 
integrity, identification etc. 
In this chapter, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool in the context of various 
systems that covers health, commercial, educational, and hospitality industry domains. We 
consider seven different requirements specifications, and for each system we show domain 
ontology, SFRD, and some samples for the detection rules that have been used in these 
systems. Also, to show the major benefits of our approach: (1) prioritizing for security 
requirements, (2) finding association between security requirements, and (3) determining the 
inconsistency ratio for security requirements.  
4.1. Online Medical Database System  
In order to capture the health domain, we select to apply our traceability approach to 
the online medical database system which aims to save time span through providing a 
searchable database of all past medic records. 
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 This system facilitates the management and medical staff through using electronic 
database instead of the manual one. It handles the current and historical illness information for 
the patient, nurse information, and patient history information such as family history as well as 
social work history. This system provides an interesting challenge because it is semantically 
rich with different domain relations. Moreover, the privacy and security issues are so critical to 
such systems.  Figure 17 shows a portion for the domain ontology for online medical database 
system.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. A part of domain ontology for an online medical database system 
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We use several detection rules to determine the effect types between security and 
functional requirements. Figure 18 shows a sample set for these rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. A sample of the detection rules for an online medical database system 
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In this system, DRC handles the tractability between four security requirements and 33 
functional requirements, so we have 132 tracing pairs. After that, DRC automatically generate 
the Security Functional Requirement Diagram for an online medical database system using the 
stored XML detection rules. Figure 19 shows SFRD for an online medical database system.  
 
 
  
Figure 19. SFRD for an online medical database system 
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In Figure 19, there exists a single detection rule that can identify a single effect type 
and cover several requirements tracing pairs such as R114 identifies the cooperative effect for 
(SR4,FR18), (SR4,FR20), (SR4,FR21), and (SR4,FR22). Also, R127 identifies the conflicting 
effect for (SR3, FR23), and (SR2, FR33). In addition, R133 identifies the irrelevant effect for 
(SR1, FR4), (SR3, FR4), (SR2, FR33), (SR1, FR7), and (SR3, FR7).  
1. Prioritization for security requirements: Based on SFRD, we can find clearly the cooperated 
functional requirements nodes for each security requirement as follows:  
• SR1 has five cooperated functional requirements: FR15, FR16, FR17, FR29, and 
FR31. 
• SR2 has six cooperated functional requirements: FR19, FR21, FR22, FR24, FR30, 
and FR32. 
• SR3 does not have any of cooperated functional requirements. 
• SR4 has eight cooperated functional requirements: FR18, FR19, FR20, FR21, FR22, 
FR24, FR30, and FR32. Therefore, the Weight for each security requirement is 
calculated as follows: 
• Weight (SR1) = 5 
• Weight (SR2) = 6 
• Weight (SR3) = 0 
• Weight (SR4) = 8, Then, prioritization for security requirements from high weight to 
low weight is: SR4, SR2, SR1, and SR3 respectively.  
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2. Finding association between security requirements: By applying Jaccard method, the 
obtaining association values between the security requirements of OMD system are as 
follows: 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 0/11 = 0 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 0/5 = 0 
• Association (SR1, SR4) = 0/13 = 0 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 0/6 = 0 
• Association (SR2, SR4) = 6/8 = 0.75 
• Association (SR3, SR4) = 0/8 = 0 
 
 
Figure 20. A weighted association graph for an online medical database system 
 
Figure 20 shows that the association between SR2 and SR4 is 0.75, which reflects 
strongly associated requirements, while the other security requirements have not any 
association between them. These association will help the requirement engineer to figure out 
the strength for the dependencies among security requirements.   
3. Inconsistency ratio for each security requirement: We can find the conflicting effects for 
each security requirement as follows: 
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• Number of conflicting effect for SR1 = 0 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR2 = 2 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR3 = 2 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR4 = 0 
• Total number of effects for each security requirement = 33, the inconsistency ratio is 
calculated by considering all the conflicting effects relative to the total number of 
effects as follows: 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR1) = 0/33 = 0 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR2) = 2/33 = 0.06 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR3) = 2/33 = 0.06 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR4) = 0/33 = 0 
In our approach, we aim to detect the inconsistency between security and functional 
requirements in order to improve the understandability and reduce the natural language 
ambiguity for the requirements text.  
Based on the inconsistency values, SR2 and SR3 have the same ratio because each of 
them has two conflicting effects out of 33 effects, but SR1 and SR4 have not any conflicting 
effect, so both have not any inconsistency. 
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4.2. Online Store System 
In order to capture the commercial domain, we select to apply our approach to the 
online store system [58] which describes online sales, distribution, and marketing for the 
products. It also concentrates on the capabilities that required by customers and their needs 
while defining product features and configurations. The user can select the product from the 
products categorization and pay online using credit card number. Figure 21 shows a portion for 
the domain ontology for an online store system.  
 
 
 
Figure 21. A part of domain ontology for an online store system 
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Based on the above domain ontology, confidential customer information can be either 
payment information or user login information (i.e., Generalization) Also, credit card number 
is a part of payment information (i.e., Aggregation) while user password is a part of user login 
information (i.e., Aggregation). Figure 22 shows a set for the detection rules that used in this 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. A sample of the detection rules for an online store system 
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 Here we can show an example for the first and second outputs files that we can obtain 
from using DRC. In the first output file, DRC finds the matching between parsing 
requirements text file and the domain ontology database as in Table 4, and the second output 
file shows the association between the parsing requirements and the matched detection rules 
numbers for each requirements pair as in Table 5.  
 
Table 4. A portion of an output file for matching parsing requirements with domain ontology 
Requirements Pair Subject-Relation 
Verb-
Relation 
Complement-
Relation 
The system shall encrypt all of the confidential 
customer information. (SR1), The system view 
detailed product categorization. (FR5) 
Identical No-Relation No-Relation 
The system shall encrypt all of the confidential 
customer information. (SR1), The system shall 
allow user to create profile and set his 
credential. (FR6) 
Association Association Aggregation 
The system shall encrypt all of the confidential 
customer information. (SR1), The system shall 
authenticate user credentials to view the profile. 
(FR7) 
Identical Association Aggregation 
The system shall encrypt all of the confidential 
customer information. (SR1), The system shall 
allow user to update the profile information. 
(FR8) 
Association 
 
Association 
 
Generalization 
The system shall encrypt all of the confidential 
customer information. (SR1), The system shall 
display both the active and completed order 
history in the customer profile. (FR9) 
Identical Association No-Relation 
The system shall never display a customer’s 
password. (SR2), The system shall display user 
login information. (FR29) 
Identical Antonyms Aggregation 
The customer’s web browser shall never display 
a customer credit card number. (SR3), The 
system shall display the credit card payment 
data. (FR22) 
Identical Antonyms Aggregation 
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In the above table, each requirements pair has a specific combination that shows the 
relation types for the security and functional requirements concepts, some tracing pairs share 
the same combination.  
 
Table 5. A portion of an output file for matching requirements with associated detection rules 
Requirements Pair Subject-Relation 
Verb-
Relation 
Complement-
Relation 
Matched 
detection 
rules ID 
The system shall encrypt all of the 
confidential customer information. 
(SR1), The system view detailed 
product categorization. (FR5) 
Identical No-Relation No-Relation 
 
294 
The system shall encrypt all of the 
confidential customer information. 
(SR1), The system shall allow user to 
create profile and set his credential. 
(FR6) 
Association Association Aggregation 
 
114 
The system shall encrypt all of the 
confidential customer information. 
(SR1), The system shall authenticate 
user credentials to view the profile. 
(FR7) 
Identical Association Aggregation 
 
261 
The system shall encrypt all of the 
confidential customer information. 
(SR1), The system shall allow user to 
update the profile information. (FR8) 
Association Association Generalization 
 
113 
The system shall encrypt all of the 
confidential customer information. 
(SR1), The system shall display both 
the active and completed order history 
in the customer profile. (FR9) 
Identical Association No-Relation 
 
266 
The system shall never display a 
customer’s password. (SR2), The 
system shall display user login 
information. (FR29) 
Identical Antonyms Aggregation 
 
275 
The customer’s web browser shall never 
display a customer credit card number. 
(SR3), system shall display credit card 
payment data. (FR22) 
Identical Antonyms Aggregation 
 
275 
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For example, (SR2, FR29), and (SR3, FR22) have the same combination: (Identical, 
Antonyms, Aggregation) for (Subject-Relation, Verb-Relation, Complement-relation) 
respectively. So, they should have the same detection rule and the same effect type.  
The second output file that has been generated by the tool shows the corresponding 
detection rule number for each requirements pair. For example, detection rule 266 (i.e., R266) 
matches with the requirements pair (SR1, FR9) as in Table 5. 
In the above table, the detection rule R261 identifies the cooperative effect for the 
tracing requirements pair (SR1, FR7), and the detection rule R294 identifies the irrelevant 
effect for the tracing requirements pair (SR1, FR5). Also, the detection rule R275 identifies the 
conflicting effect for the tracing requirements pairs (SR2, FR29), and (SR3, FR22). By using 
DRC, the user can generate the first table and the second table as we described above. Also, 
the user can generate SFRD that collects required information from the previous tables and 
graphically illustrates the effect type and the associated detection rule of each requirements 
tracing pair for an online store system as in Figure 23.  
SFRD generates 105 tracing links that captures the whole tracing between the three 
security requirements and 35 functional requirements. Each security requirement has been 
traced to 35 functional requirements, and since it has three security requirements then it has in 
total 105 tracing links that cover all security and functional requirements sets.  
In the online store system, the detection rules R114, R113, R261, and R261 identify 16 
cooperative effect. Also, the detection rule R294 identifies two conflicting effect, and the 
detection rules R266, R119, R294, R147, R280, and R133 identify 87 irrelevant effect.  
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Figure 23. SFRD for an online store system 
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Among all cooperative detection rules, we find that R114 identifies 8 requirements 
pairs, R261 identifies 4 requirements pairs, R260 identifies two requirements pairs, and R113 
identifies two requirements pairs. For conflicting effect, there is only one detection rule that 
identifies two requirements pairs. While for irrelevant detection rules, we find that R280 
identifies 22 requirements pairs, and R133 only identifies two requirements pairs. 
SFRD enables the user to: (1) better understanding the requirements inter-traceability, 
(2) perceiving the most important security requirements, and (3) associating the similar 
functional requirements based on the mutual dependencies. 
As we can notice from the above SFRD that all the parsing requirements pairs that 
have the same combination will be identified by the same effect type. Different security 
requirements have different effects on the same functional requirement. For example, the 
requirements pair (SR1, FR22) has a cooperative effect with the associated detection rule 261, 
(SR2, FR22) has irrelevant effect with associated detection rule 280, and the requirements pair 
(SR3, FR22) has conflicting effect associated detection rule 275. In addition, the requirements 
pair (SR1, FR29) has a cooperative effect with the associated detection rule 260, the 
requirements pair (SR2, FR29) has conflicting effect associated detection rule 275, and the 
requirements pair (SR3, FR29) has irrelevant effect with associated detection rule 280. 
1. Prioritization for security requirements  
One of the significant uses for the traceability approach is to prioritize security 
requirements based on their weight. Weight is calculated by counting the number of the 
functional requirements that cooperate with the security requirement as follows: 
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• Weight (SR1) = 9 
• Weight (SR2) = 4 
• Weight (SR3) = 3, so the prioritization for the security requirements is: SR1, SR2, 
SR3. 
2. Finding association between security requirements as in Figure 24: 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 4/9= 0.44 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 3/9= 0.33 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 0/7= 0.0 
 
 
Figure 24. A weighted association graph for an online store system 
 
3. Inconsistency ratio for each security requirement: the number of conflicting effect for each 
security requirement is calculated as follows: 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR1 = 0 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR2 = 1 
• Number of conflicting effect for SR3 = 1 
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• Total number of effects for each security requirement = 35, then the inconsistency 
ratio for each security requirement is calculated as follows: 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR1) = 0/35 = 0 % 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR2) = 1/35 = 3% 
• Inconsistency ratio (SR3) = 1/35 = 3% 
4.3. Course Management System/ Students 
In order to capture the educational domain, we select to apply our approach to the 
course management system [59], it is a software application used to control the virtual 
educational environments, enhance classroom education, and as a platform for distance 
learning programs.  
This system enriched with multiple features and different strong capabilities that 
empower instructors to professionally manage courses contents, construct projects or 
assignments, and manage a collaboration environment for the students that enable the students 
to effectively communicate with the instructor. The course management system helps 
academic organizations to accomplish communication and valuation objectives. 
This system specifies the requirements for students and lecturers, the functional and 
security requirements are separated for each of them. It has a specific glossary that defines the 
exact meanings for personal information, static course information, dynamic course 
information, and study information as in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Glossary of course management system requirements terms 
Term Meaning 
Personal Information Information about a person, such as name, address, a picture, 
interests, etc. 
Study Information Information about a person’s study progress, such as subscribed 
courses, grades and exam attempts. 
Assistant Lecturers Lecturers who assist the principal lecturer for a course. 
Static Course 
Information 
Information of a course which does not change while a course is 
given, but between semesters. This includes the lecturer, and study 
material. 
Dynamic Course 
Information 
Information of a course which changes while a course is given. 
This includes news messages, archived files and roster. 
Secondary University 
Systems 
All university systems which are shared by different departments, 
such as a central address book containing all kinds of personal 
information. 
Manage Manage involves create, set, rename, read, update, and delete. 
 
In this system we will show how we can apply our traceability approach for tracing the 
security and functional requirements, the student system has four security requirements and 17 
functional requirements. 
The domain ontology provides a semantic repository about the concepts and relations 
for a particular domain. Our domain ontology captures three main concepts of a requirement 
statement: requirement entity, requirement action, and requirement target.  
Moreover, it identifies the semantic relation between these concepts. For example, user 
is a subject-concept, which reflects requirement entity, and there exists a generalization 
relation between student and user.  Figure 25 shows a portion for the domain ontology for the 
student requirements in the course management system.  
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Figure 25. A part of domain ontology for students system 
 
Also, change is a verb-concept, which reflects requirement action, and it aggregates 
from several actions such as: edit. Then, there exists an aggregation relation between manage 
and edit actions. There is antonyms relation between “change” and “shall not change”. In 
addition, course information is a complement-concept, which reflects requirement target, and it 
has two sub complement-concepts: static course information, and dynamic course information.  
 
55 
 
Then, there exists a generalization relation between them such static course information 
is a course information, and dynamic course information is a course information.  
Similarly, user-privacy is a complement-concept, and it has many parts such: student 
contact information, student personal information, and student password. Also, personal 
information is a complement-concept and it briefly describes the information about the person 
and it aggregates from several complement-concepts: student name, student address, and 
student picture, and student interests. Also, Study information is a complement-concept and it 
aggregates from several complement-concepts: exams, grades, courses, and history of attended 
courses.  
By using the domain ontology and the detection rules, our tractability tool illustrates 
the Security Functional Requirements Diagram for students system that has four security 
requirements as columns and 17 functional requirements as rows as in Figure 26. Our 
traceability approach simplifies the requirements traceability process and allows the user to 
easy understand the requirements implementation. 
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Figure 26. SFRD for students system 
 
1. Prioritization for security requirements:  
• Weight (SR1) = 4 
• Weight (SR2) = 1 
• Weight (SR3) = 2 
• Weight (SR4) = 5, the prioritization from high to low is: SR4, SR1, SR3, and 
SR2. 
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2. Finding association between security requirements: We find association among security 
requirements as in Figure 27. 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 0/5= 0.0 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 2/4= 0.50 
• Association (SR1, SR4) = 0/9= 0.0 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 0/3= 0.0 
• Association (SR2, SR4) = 1/5= 0.20 
• Association (SR3, SR4) = 0/7= 0.0 
 
 
Figure 27. A weighted association graph for students system 
The weighted association graph provides a very useful information that can be used 
requirements change process such it can be effectively used to estimate the cost of 
requirements change as well as considering the impact of this change. For example, in Figure 
30, the association value for (SR1 and SR3) reflects that both requirements strongly connected 
to each other’s, while the association value for (SR2 and SR4) indicates that both requirements 
weakly connected.  
58 
 
As a result, in case of requirements changing for either SR1 or SR3, the impact of 
change will be higher than requirements change for SR2 or SR4. In other words, the cost of 
requirements change in the first case will be greater than the cost of requirements change in the 
second case.      
3. Inconsistency: there is no inconsistency for this particular requirements set because it does 
not have any conflicting effect. 
4.4. Course Management System/ Lecturers  
This system describes the functional and security requirements for the lecturers in the 
course management system, we will show how we can apply our traceability approach for 
tracing the security and functional requirements for the lecturers.  
Figure 28 shows a portion for the domain ontology for the lecturer’s subsystem 
requirements. The domain ontology has several relations. . For example, user is a subject-
concept, which reflects requirement entity, and there exists a generalization relation between 
lecturer and user. Also, manage is a verb-concept, which reflects requirement action, and it 
aggregates from several actions such as: create, insert, remove, read, update, rename, and etc. 
Then, there exists an aggregation relation between manage and the other actions.  
In addition, dynamic course information is a complement-concept that has many 
complement-concepts: news messages, achieved files, roster, and course materials. Similarly, 
“All grades for all students” is a complement-concept and it has many complement-concepts: 
student’s grades, team’s grades, student’s grading policy, and student’s grade statistics. As a 
result, there is an aggregation relation between them. The lecturer’s subsystem has three 
security requirements and 35 functional requirements.  
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Figure 28. A part of domain ontology for lecturers system 
 
 
 
60 
 
Figure 29 shows a sample for the detection rules that have been used by our approach 
to detect effect types for lecturers’ requirements. We show two detection rules that identify the 
cooperative effect: R265 and R282 while the three detection rules: R294, R289, and R259 
identify the irrelevant effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. A sample of the detection rules for lecturers system 
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Since the lecturer’s subsystem has three security requirements and 35 functional 
requirements, then it has 105 tracing links such: 15 cooperative effect, 90 irrelevant effect, and 
zero conflicting effects as in Figure 30. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. SFRD for lecturers system 
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1. Prioritization for the security requirements: 
• Weight (SR1) = 6 
• Weight (SR2) = 3 
• Weight (SR3) = 6 
Since both SR1 and SR3 have the same priority, therefore, the prioritization from high 
to low is either (SR3, SR1, SR2) or (SR1, SR3, SR2). 
2. Finding association between security requirements: We find association among security 
requirements as in Figure 31. 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 3/6= 0.50 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 0/12= 0.0 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 0/9= 0.0 
 
 
Figure 31. A weighted association graph for lecturers system 
 
From Figure 31, we can find that SR1 associated with only SR2, and there is no an 
association between (SR1, SR3), (SR2, SR3). Knowing this valuable information indicates that 
the impact of change SR1 will affect only SR2, and it will not affect SR3. In addition, the 
impact of change SR2 will not affect SR3 since there is not any common parts between them. 
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3. Inconsistency: There is no inconsistency for this particular requirements set because it does 
not have any conflicting effect. 
4.5. Health Monitor System  
Health domain [60] is one of the most critical domain in which the security features are 
very critical to the health staff and to the patients, health domain is one of the complex domain 
that takes into account the other political and legal issues. Consequently, most of these 
software that developed in health domain are critical because they encompass people health in 
a large scale and therefore are very delicate to faults come from different requirements 
sources, so it is very important to trace the security and functional requirements to figure out 
the relationships for such systems. 
 In order to capture the health domain, we select to apply our approach to the health 
monitor system [61] which aims to help the users to check their food healthy level. Health 
Monitor software provides a diet chart and fitness plan to the users based on various factors 
that the user entered to the system which include: age, gender, race, height, weight, individual 
life style, food habits details, diet plans, and exercise plans.  
The system help the user to follow a healthy food style and keep them away from 
various chronic diseases by showing several beneficial nutritional information for several 
types of food such as calories contents and junky food effects, It let the user to judge how 
healthy they are through asking several questions and a obtain facts from the user that related 
to the food habits, exercise, and life style.  
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This system requires to apply the provided web server security that related to the web 
services and the server database protection as well as keep the entered user data private and 
secured form the disclosure or other unauthorized access from hackers. This system has three 
security requirements and 30 functional requirements. Figure 32 shows a portion for the 
domain ontology for the health monitor system. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. A part of domain ontology for health monitor system 
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The Figure 33 shows SFRD for lecturers has 29 cooperative effect, 31 irrelevant effect, 
and zero conflicting effects. 
 
 
Figure 33. SFRD for health monitor system 
 
1. Prioritization for the security requirements: 
• Weight (SR1) = 13 
• Weight (SR2) = 5 
• Weight (SR3) = 11, the prioritization from high to low is: SR1, SR3, and SR2. 
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2. Finding association between security requirements: We find association among security 
requirements as in Figure 34: 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 3/15= 0.20 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 3/21= 0.14 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 5/11= 0.45 
 
 
Figure 34. A weighted association graph for health monitor system 
 
3. Inconsistency for the security requirements: there is no inconsistency for this particular 
requirements set because it does not have any conflicting effect. 
4.6. Automated Railway Reservation System 
In order to capture the booking system environment, we will apply our approach on the 
automated railway reservation system [62], it has been designed to provide an electronic 
version of the railway passenger reservation system.  The system will have a user-friendly 
graphical interface and will be more cost effective compared to the current non-electronic 
version of the reservation system. This system provide customers to get their tickets in a more 
convenient way and control of the railway ticket sales to avoid scalping and overselling of 
tickets. 
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Figure 35. A part of domain ontology for railway reservation system 
 
Figure 35 shows a portion of domain ontology for railway reservation system. This 
system is relatively small and has only two security requirements and 10 functional 
requirements. Figure 36 shows SFRD for lecturers that has 6 cooperative effect, 14 irrelevant 
effect, and zero conflicting effects. 
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Figure 36. SFRD for railway reservation system 
 
1. Prioritization for security requirements: 
• Weight (SR1) = 5 
• Weight (SR2) = 1, the prioritization from high to low is: SR1, SR2. 
2. Finding association between security requirements:  
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 1/5= 0.20 
As a result, SR1 and SR2 positively affect the first functional requirements that 
describe the login functionality, it includes valid username and password (i.e., FR1) 
considered as a part from the customer information that should not supposed to compromise 
(i.e., SR1) as well as valid username and password used by the system to authenticate the 
authorized user (i.e., SR2). 
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Figure 37 shows the weighted graph for the association between SR1 and SR2, SR1 
ensures to keep the user information from the disclosure, while SR2 ensures the authentication 
for the access to enable only the authorized users reach the system. 
 
 
Figure 37. A weighted association graph for railway reservation system 
 
3. Inconsistency:  there is no inconsistency for this particular requirements set because it does 
not have any conflicting effect. 
4.7. Hotel Management System  
In order to capture the hospitality industry domain, we select to apply our approach to 
hotel management system [63] is one of the popular software solution that used in hospitality 
industry such as: hotels, resorts, inns, motels, and lodges. Our product hotel management 
system is a comprehensive software suite consisting of combined elements for various aspects 
of hotel management. The software product to be produced is a hotel management system 
which will automate the major hotel operations.   
The first subsystem is a reservation which keeps track of reservations and room 
availability.  The second subsystem is the tracking and selling food which charges the current 
room and meals.  The third subsystem is a general management services and automated tasks 
which generates reports to audit all hotel operations and allows modification of subsystem.  
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The system will be able to handle many services to take care of all customers in a quick 
manner. Additionally, the system should be user appropriate, easy to use, provide easy 
recovery of errors and have an overall end user high subjective satisfaction. 
The system has 3 security requirements and 23 functional requirements, the security 
requirements for hotel management system describe the access control for the hotel customer 
service representative and manager such as customer service representative has only access the 
reservation and food subsystem while the manager can access the whole three subsystems: 
reservation, food, and management subsystems. The manager has the privileges to add, delete, 
and modify the information that related to rooms, menu items, and price while the customer 
representative can only modify the customer reservations.  
Figure 38 shows the domain ontology for the hotel management system. According to 
the domain ontology for hotel system, user is subject-concept and it can be customer service 
representative, or manager. Access is a verb-concept and it aggregates from several verb-
concepts: add, delete, and modify.  
Furthermore, reservation subsystem is a complement-concept and it aggregates from 
many complement-concepts: customer’s name, room number, number of occupants, check in 
date/time, and check out date/time. In the same way, food subsystem is a complement-concept 
and it aggregates from many complement-concepts: restaurant booking, purchasing meals, and 
payment for meals. 
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Figure 38. A part of domain ontology for hotel management system 
 
The Figure 39 shows SFRD for hotel management system that has 29 cooperative 
effect, 40 irrelevant effect, and zero conflicting effect as follows: 
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Figure 39. SFRD for hotel management system 
 
As we can notice from the above SFRD, SR1 and SR2 affected several common 
mutual functional requirements because SR1 consider the access to reservation and food 
subsystems while SR2 includes SR1 plus the access to management subsystem. In this 
particular case, this means that both requirements are strongly associated, while SR1 and SR3 
are weakly associated. Figure 40 shows a sample for the used detection rules that have been 
used to capture the relationship between security and functional requirements. 
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Figure 40. A sample of the detection rules for hotel management system 
 
1. Prioritization for the security requirements: 
• Weight (SR1) = 12 
• Weight (SR2) = 16 
• Weight (SR3) = 1, the prioritization from high to low is: SR2, SR1, and SR3. 
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2. Finding association between security requirements: We find association among security 
requirements as in Figure 41: 
• Association (SR1, SR2) = 12/16 = 0.75 
• Association (SR1, SR3) = 0/13= 0.0 
• Association (SR2, SR3) = 1/17= 0.05 
 
 
Figure 41. A weighted association graph for hotel management system 
 
As we can see in Figure 41, since SR1 considers reservation and food subsystems 
while SR2 considers reservation, food, and management subsystems, then both SR1 and SR2 
are highly dependent on each other such as SR2 contains SR1. 
Our approach can be applied to various types of requirements domain, in this research 
we show how we can apply our traceability approach for four different domains: health, 
educational, commercial, and hospitality industry. Table 7 statistically summarizes the number 
for security requirements, functional requirements, number of cooperative, number of 
conflicting, and number of irrelevant effects, and number of generated tracing links 
correspondingly for each system. 
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Table 7. Statistical summary for all systems 
System  
 
No. of 
SR 
No. of 
FR 
No. of 
Cooperative  
No. of 
Conflicting 
No. of  
Irrelevant  
No. of 
Tracing 
links 
Online 
Medical 
4 33 19 4 109 132 
Online Store   3 63 16 2 171 189 
Students 4 17 12 0 56 68 
Lecturers 3 35 15 0 90 105 
Health 
monitor 
3 30 29 0 61 90 
Railway 
reservation 
2 10 6 0 14 20 
Hotel 
management 
3 23 29 0 40 69 
 
We find that online medical database system and health monitor system are the most 
critical systems since they belong to the health domain. Among all seven systems, we can find 
that both of health monitor and hotel management system have the largest number for 
cooperative effect, online medical system has the largest number for conflicting effect. 
Moreover, online store system has the largest number for irrelevant effect. 
4.8. Evaluation for DRC Tool 
Several metrics have been used to assess the quality of the automated tracing tools by 
comparing with the manual tracing. The manual tracing [64] is still widely used approach in 
requirements traceability, and it considers the human judgment based on the domain 
knowledge. Today, manual traceability method is still preferred by a significant percentage of 
software industry because in requirements engineering phase. 
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We cannot avoid or ignore the knowledge for the experts who have several years of 
experience in this particular domain. To evaluate the results of our tool with the manual tracing 
results, we decide to use accuracy [65] which measures the degree to which a requirements 
tracing tool returns all the correct matching effect types with the manual tracing as in Equation 
3: 
 tracingmanual from effects ofnumber  Total
  tracing tooland manual from effects matchingcorrectly  ofNumber  Accuracy =      (Eq. 3) 
 We evaluate each of security requirement for all systems. For example, Figure 42 
shows the comparison results between manual and tool tracing of SR4 for an online medical 
database system.  
 
 
Figure 42. Manual and DRC tracing of SR4 for an online medical database system 
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We can see that there are 29 matching, and 4 non-matching nodes. As a result, 
according to Formula 3, the accuracy for SR4 is 0.87. The requirements that highlighted in 
orange represent the non-matching nodes between DRC and manual tracing: FR22, FR23, 
FR24, and FR33. To show the accuracy of all security requirements for all systems. We find 
the accuracy for each single security requirement by comparing the matching between the 
results of manual tracing and tool tracing. Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, 
Table 13, and Table 14 show the accuracy ratio for security requirements for an online medical 
database, online store, students, lecturers, health monitor, railway reservation, and hotel 
management systems respectively.  
Table 8. Accuracy for online medical database security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 27 27/*33= 0.81 
SR2 26 26/33= 0.78 
SR3 25 25/33= 0.75 
SR4 24 29/33= 0.87 
 
Table 9. Accuracy for online store security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 30 30/*35= 0.85 
SR2 30 30/35= 0.85 
SR3 29 29/35= 0.82 
 
 
 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 35 
 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 33 
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Table 10. Accuracy for student’s security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 13 13/*17= 0.76 
SR2 16 16/17= 0.94 
SR3 14 14/17= 0.82 
SR4 13 13/17= 0.76 
 
 
Table 11. Accuracy for lecturer’s security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 26 26/*36= 0.72 
SR2 27 27/36= 0.75 
SR3 31 31/36= 0.86 
 
 
Table 12. Accuracy for health monitor security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 26 26/*30= 0.86 
SR2 23 23/30= 0.76 
SR3 25 25/30= 0.83 
 
 
 
 
 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 30 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 36 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 17 
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Table 13. Accuracy for railway reservation security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 9 9/*10= 0.90 
SR2 9 9/10= 0.90 
 
 
Table 14. Accuracy for hotel management security requirements 
Security requirements  Matching between DRC 
and manual tracing 
Accuracy  
SR1 19 19/*23= 0.82 
SR2 18 18/23= 0.78 
SR3 17 17/23= 0.73 
 
 
    The experiments with our tool has indicated that it is capable of generating effect 
types at reasonable accuracy rates, In particular with respect to accuracy, we have identified 
the need to propose new effect types to capture the effect types that the existing detection rules 
fail to identify.  
Based on the results that we obtain from the above tables, we can summarize that by 
using our tool, we can get an overall accuracy 80% comparing to the manual tracing which 
reflects a very acceptable accuracy level according to the study in [66]. We observe like 
different systems have different accuracy values due to several reasons such as: (1) the human 
errors that occurs in the manual tracing, (2) coverage for the detection rules that used in our 
tool, and (3) domain nature for the requirements.  
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 23 
*No. of effects for manual tracing = 10 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1. Conclusions  
In this research, we introduce a new hybrid traceability approach for using syntactic 
parsing, domain ontology, and a rule based system. Our approach helps to identify 
cooperative, conflicting, and irrelevant effects of security upon the functional requirements. 
Our approach offers several benefits: (1) it serves as a structured mechanism to simplify the 
finding of effects, (2) it bridges the gap between functional and non-functional requirements, 
and (3) it supports the requirements analysis to improve consistency between conflicting 
requirements.  
We introduced DRC tool that will help automatically generate all the possible 
combinations for concepts and relations in both security and functional requirements, automate 
the construction process of detection rules, and generate SFRD. DRC automatically captures 
the effect of security requirements upon functional requirements based on using predefined 
detection rules. Our approach allows the users to construct several detection rules to discover 
relationships between security and functional requirements by combining the syntactic and 
semantic analysis of requirements.  
We presented a several case studies of using DRC, which showed how using DRC led 
to improve inconsistency checking and better understanding of the inter requirements 
traceability. A valuable feature of our approach is that users can create domain ontology, and 
identify effect types based on the user-defined detection rules. DRC shows several benefits 
comparing with the current inter-requirements traceability tools by relating functional and non-
functional requirements, captures syntactic and semantic aspects of requirements. 
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Also, it considers consistency checking of the relations, and provide a several 
reasoning rules for each identified relationships between security and functional requirements. 
By using our DRC tool, we get an 80% accuracy comparing with the manual tracing. 
5.2. Future Work  
Our future work includes to extend DRC to cover the other non-functional 
requirements effects onto functional ones. As a result, we can apply it for large applications. 
We plan to show the effects for the maintainability, availability, portability, and recoverability 
requirements upon functional requirements by proposing several additional detection rules, as 
well as, extend our domain ontology by adding more semantic concepts and relations that will 
capture various types of requirements domains. 
In addition, we plan to propose a specific detection rules that control the impact of 
requirements change. We will focus on traceability impact analysis which concentrates on 
traceability links as the main key to express relationships between security and functional 
requirements. The analysis of the impact of security requirement changes onto other functional 
requirements can be based on requirements traceability. Requirements effect types (i.e., 
dependencies types) can be used as trace links to identify the impact of requirements change. 
The goal of impact analysis in our research is to identify which security or functional are either 
explicitly or implicitly affected by this particular proposed change. We intend to consider two 
different types of changes, the first proposed type is changes in security and functional 
requirements: (1) adding new requirement, (2) deleting current requirement, and (3) modifying 
current requirement. The second proposed type is changes in effect types: (1) adding new 
effect type, (2) deleting current effect type, and (3) modifying current effect type. 
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